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Summary
In H. Garbers [3] the author was concerned with modeling
the monthly logarithmic CHF/USD exchange rate, st. He
rejected a model proposed by B.T. McCallum. Searching for
a more appropriate framework a story by P. De Grauwe [2]
was introduced, bringing complex cognitive processes and
social practices into the picture.
This paper treats again P. De Grauwe’s story, supplements
it and embedds it into a broader setting showing its links to
a subtle concept of agents’ rationality. We derive a testable
implication of this approach. Although the test result is
negative, it will be helpful for the misspecification analysis
of B.T. McCallum’s model [7] (applied to st), which will
finally be presented in Part III of this paper.
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Introduction
We start again by discussing the subjective character of agents’
probability distributions, but this time from a different per-
spective compared to Part I of the paper. While different
methods are applied to treat them, further probabilities are
introduced into the analysis. In chapter 4 we are, for instance,
concerned measuring the probabilities of a certain system to
remain in a taken up regime in period t during t + 1 or its
probability to change into another regime.
But before we are able to estimate and to discuss these prob-
abilities, these regimes have to be introduced together with a
lot of necessary ”background knowledge” concerning especially
the properties of cognitive processes.
1
1 Concepts of Rationality and Uncertainty
Remember:
We started Part I of this paper by applying B.T. Mc-
Callum’s model (I) to st and rejected it.
We made the RE hypothesis responsible for this re-
jection.
We discussed M. Kurz’s theory [6] of rational be-
lief which led us to the subjectivity of the proba-
bilites implied, to endogenous uncertainties, to non-
stationarities and regime switches.
While the subjectivity appeared in our previous paper together
with the non-stationarity of the corresponding time series, the
latter is not a necessary condition for the former one to show
up.
In economics one generally begins with a statement (an Initial
Hypothesis) such as:
”Social science is the study of human behavior. (...)
economics is that discipline within social science (...)
which seeks explanation of human events on the basis
of the changes in opportunities faced by individuals.
(...). Tastes are assumed to be constant (...).” (E.
Silberberg, p. 2 [11])
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Hence a complete preference association is normally sub-
scribed to the subjects. Further definition is achieved by the
introduction of utility functions. In effect a (constrained) max-
imization of the utility functions formalizes the fact that eco-
nomic agents behave rationally under the forces of well-un-
derstood personal interest.
On the basis of a rationality under well-understood personal
interest of the agents, economics has developed a device for
situations which are basically time independent and free of
significant uncertainties. This has achieved results which are
of importance for appropriate decision-makers (for example,
owners of cinemas who must define the prices of entrance tick-
ets and snacks during the break). The basic problem is that
without further major effort economists have subsequently
transferred the statements obtained in this way to more
general situations (D.M. Kreps, p. 19 [5]).
In a widespread generalization of the initial hypothesis the ex-
pected utility theory represents the behavior of the individual
as decisional behavior under uncertainty. It postulates a situa-
tion in which all possible results xi of a decision are at first just
as well known as the probability of the occurrence of xi. For
the evaluation of the decisions, which are interpreted as lotter-
ies, determinations are then made according to utility values
u(·) of the individual possible results (wins or losses), and their
probabilities p(xi) of occurrence (given the decision). Finally,
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that decision is achieved which has the highest expected utility:
Let X be a finite set of N possible results of a lottery L,
which can be described as a vector (p1, . . . , pN) of probabili-
ties. The agents are assumed to possess preferences concerning
the set L of all these vectors, which represent in each case a
probability distribution of X . The preference ordering (≥)
of an individual can then be characterized (under certain ad-
ditional assumptions concerning ”≥”):
There is a function u : X → R, so that for L,L′ from L it
can be stated:
L ≥ L′ if and only if
N∑
n=1
pnun ≥
N∑
n=1
p′nun .
However, if no such a priori probabilities are given, it is no
longer possible to make use of the above theory. If a set Ω =
{1, . . . , S} of states of the world and a set of functions h ∈ H
with h : Ω→ X , which can be interpreted as ”state contingent
payoff functions”, exists, then L.J. Savage [9] has proposed a
theory which is based on a preference ordering (≥) on H.
With certain additional assumptions concerning h, g ∈ H,
this theory concludes that there is jointly a utility function
u : Ω→ R and probabilities p1, . . . , ps, so that
h ≥ g implies
S∑
s=1
psu
(
h(s)
)
≥
S∑
s=1
psu
(
g(s)
)
.
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Hence in this case the probabilities ps for the states of the
world are dependent on the preferences of the individuals.
Consequently they represent subjective probabilities which no
longer represent autonomous descriptions of the real world.
In general it was possible to reveal essential deficiencies in
the expected utility theory by laboratory experiments (D.M.
Kreps, pp. 116ff [5]). In a large number of laboratory ex-
periments, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman ([16], [17]), for
example, found that
1. formulations of a decision problem, which are different, but
equivalent in content, do not lead to equivalent decisions
in completely analogous experiments
2. the evaluation of a decision for a given u(xi) is non-linear
in the p(xi),
3. possible losses are given a substantially greater weight than
corresponding profits.
In their prominent Prospect Theory, which represents a re-
action to the apparent deficits, A. Tversky and D. Kahne-
man [16] replace the utility function u by an evaluation func-
tion v, which is concave in the range xi > 0, convex for xi < 0
and is more steeply inclined for xi < 0 than for xi > 0. In ad-
dition, instead of p(xi), they use a weighting function, which
provides a greater weighting to initially small values of p(xi),
giving the other p(xi) values a smaller weighting.
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Hence the transition from the expected utility theory to the
”Prospect” theory is not much more than the transition from
one formalization to another formalization of a theory which
remains based on the concept of an expected value. However,
it is now an expected value, which additionally attempts, in a
rather obscure fashion, to capture certain aspects of risk, above
and beyond u(·).
An alternative and less ad hoc concept has been constructed
in the ”rational random behavior” model which is described in
detail in H. Theil (p. 80) [15]. It contains an additional struc-
ture of non-trivial decision-processes proposing a procedure for
agents to select ”their” probabilities.
Let !x represent the vector of the decision variables of a deci-
sion-maker, which may be an individual, a household, etc. !x is
affected by a very large number of factors, which the decision-
maker groups into two classes in order to reduce the level of
complexity: in the class which is recognized as being essential
and in that of less important factors. In the planning stage,
the decision-maker considers particularly the first class. For
this purpose he has a criterion function f(!x), which systemat-
ically ignores the influence of the less important factors. It is
assumed that f can be continuously differentiated three times
and that at the location !x ∗ there is a uniquely determined
maximum within its range of definition, so that
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f
(
!x
)
= f
(
!x ∗
)
+
1
2
(
!x− !x ∗
)′
H
(
!x− !x ∗
)
+ O
(∥∥!x− !x ∗∥∥3)
(1)
with the symmetrical and negatively definite Hessian matrix
H(!x ∗) =: H .
In the planning phase the decision-maker additionally consid-
ers the class of less important influence factors. He anticipates
that their existence implies in the implementation phase a de-
cision vector, which must be viewed as a vectorial random
variable, the distribution of which has to be defined in the first
stage. Accordingly, the decision function appears as a decision
distribution, which should be determined ”rationally”.
From (1) it follows that
f
(
!x ∗
)
−f
(
!x
)
= − 1
2
(
!x−!x ∗
)′
H
(
!x−!x ∗
)
+O
(∥∥!x−!x ∗∥∥3)
represents a loss in terms of f , if !x is realized instead of !x ∗.
This loss can also be seen as a random variable, whose remain-
der O
(‖!x− !x ∗‖3), however, is ignored by the decision-maker
in order to further reduce the level of complexity. The expected
”loss” (L¯) can then be written as
L¯ := − 1
2
E
[(
!x− !x ∗)′H(!x− !x ∗)] = − 1
2
trace HΣ
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with
Σ := E
[(
!x− !x ∗)(!x− !x ∗)′] .
The decision-maker attempts to keep this as small as possible
during the planning phase. At the same time he wants to re-
main as flexible as possible in terms of the distribution law of
!x, H. Theil [15] introduced a corresponding function Φ, which
decreases monotonously with (L¯) and increases monotonously
with the entropy of the distribution of !x. He can show that
under the assumption that every component of !x varies with-
out limitation in the range (−∞,∞), Φ is maximized by the
probability density function
gk(!x) =
|−H|12
(2pik)
n
2
exp
{
1
2k
(
!x− !x ∗)′H(!x− !x ∗)}
with k > 0, !x ∈ Rn. H. Theil [15] designated this distribution
as ”rational random behavior for decision variables with range
(−∞,∞) and k > 0”. Apparently the distribution sought
is a multivariate normal distribution with the expected value
!x ∗ and the covariance matrix (−kH−1). The value of k > 0
depends through Φ still on the preferences of the decision-
maker concerning the entropy and the expected losses in the
planning phase.
We conclude that a rigid decision distribution concept has been
formalized, which connects uncertainty and rationality. No-
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tice that again contrary to the so-called primary probabilities
in natural science experiments, only probabilities are consid-
ered, which are essentially based on the preferences and the
incomplete information of the decision-maker. The entropy-
maximizing aspect of the approach in the second phase appears
then to be an elegant aspect of agents’ probability selection
problem.
The ”Rational Random Behaviour” model is, however, con-
cerned with a representative agent in a strange static frame-
work. To introduce time explicitly into this picture one can
think of changes in !x ∗, H and/or Σ from some periods to
other ones implying a series of normal distribution gk1(!x), . . . .
Each gki(!x) is indicating a certain regime ignoring, however,
the specific dynamics of cognitive processes, which we are go-
ing to study now.
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2 Dynamic Aspects of Cognitive Processes
Unlike the uncertainty we have been dealing with in chapter
1, the one which is present e.g. at foreign exchange markets,
implies a complex structure.
Imagine an agent who interacts with his environment without
being able to act on the basis of a function, which allocates
a specific decision to each condition of the environment, should
the environment be in the appropriate state.2 Since he is only
partially aware of the state of his environment, he can only
reach a sufficient ability to judge it (e.g. a market) through an
increasing number of interactions and observations. However,
this generates in him a level of expectation and hence poten-
tially may stop the search process: if a decision procedure
does not satisfy the appropriate level of expectation, then the
agent searches for further procedures – perhaps even more in-
tensively, whereas in the other case it may be reduced or even
completely stopped. Here the level of expectation does not
represent a fixed value. Rather it may increase or decrease, for
example, with the ease or difficulty of finding new procedures
or with the efforts of comparable individuals. Accordingly the
search implies an interaction between solutions and level of ex-
pectations (H. Simon, p. 323 [12]).
2 This stands in contrast to so-called ”reinforcement learning” (R.S. Sutton, A.G. Barto [14])
which designates a function of this kind as ”politics”.
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It is quite obvious that by H. Simon’s bounded rationality
concept complex cognitive processes (and social practices) of
agents come into the picture. We proceed by learning about it
under relatively simple experimental conditions.
In certain situations, the results of experimental economics in-
dicate the existence of a ”status quo bias” (endowment effect).
V.L. Smith [13] gives an illustrating example of this effect,
which we would like to describe here in a slightly modified
form: a person buys a number of bottles of wine for 8 USD
per bottle. A few years later he receives an offer of 100 USD
per bottle. However, the offer is refused, even though he had
never in his life paid more than 50 USD to buy a bottle of wine
from a retailer.
What is manifested in this seemingly harmless little example
is the observation made over and over again in the most varied
experiments that, after acquiring goods (an alteration of their
endowment), people very often value them more highly than
before. This applies for goods with close substitutes, which
are frequently traded on the market, but particularly for those
which are rarely traded and have few possibilities of substi-
tution. In the second case, however, a much larger positive
difference between the price per unit which a person would
request for a sale and that which they would be prepared to
pay for the purchase of a further unit (G.C. Morrison [8]) is
generally observed.
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Nowadays in the literature it is generally agreed that the ”sta-
tus quo bias” indeed exists and signalizes a dependence of the
preferences on the possession of individual goods. Hence the
preferences of economic subjects must indeed be viewed as
endogenous and temporally variable. A simple parallel with
marketing research – to which the ”status quo effect” could also
be ascribed – confirms additionally that many of our courses
of action are not based on a mechanical sequence, but rather
that extended stimulation/reaction models have to be con-
sidered. They take account of certain communicative intellec-
tual processes of an individual happening in a period between
the stimulations and the reactions.
”Cognitive dissonances” are based on the fact that individuals
possess a ”cognitive system” focusing on its environment, on
itself as well as on its behavior, and comprising its knowledge,
its opinions and beliefs (in the sense of believing something to
be true or untrue). Cognitive dissonances always attempt to
establish consistency of the system. If this then is put under
strain by a new ”cognition”, then the individual perceives the
corresponding condition as unpleasant and attempts to return
it to a stress-free condition.
Given then a complex cognitive situation, agents will be driven
by the force of dissonances. These trigger the operation of ”ra-
tionality principles”, which at all events ensure a consistency
in the system in the sense that its set of cognitive statements
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is ”closed” with respect to elementary logical deductions: The
cognitive system itself collects information concerning the sta-
tus of its information processing and uses it consistently. In
this way the system as a whole endeavours to become coherent
and connected , without unexplained gaps. To demonstrate,
consider an example which is taken from R.J. Shiller [10].
”Psychologists Pennington and Hastie have shown the
importance of stories in decision making by studying
how jurors reached decisions in difficult cases. They
found that jurors’ approaches to reasoning through
the complicated issues of the trial tended to take the
form of constructing a story, filling out the details that
were provided to them about the case into a coher-
ent narrative of the chain of events. In describing
their verdict, they tended not to speak of quantities
or probabilities, or of summing up the weight of the
evidence, but rather to merely tell a story of the case,
typically a chronology of events, and to remark how
well their story fit together and how internally consis-
tent it was.”
In total this thereby suggests that in the cognitive system of
an individual, the operation of ”rationality principles” is ob-
served, which at all events ensures a consistency in his system
and goes beyond that.
Note the treatment of probabilities in the above quotation.
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3 Social Practices and the Rationality of Agents
Following H. Simon’s bounded rationality concept we find a
dynamic structure in agents’ cognitive processes. Addition-
ally, the discussion points out to the existence of a normative
aspect by linking those cognitive processes to certain social
practices. Moreover, it is here that we finally come back to the
story of foreign exchange markets told by P. De Grauwe [2]
and presented with emphasis and at greater length in our ear-
lier paper [3].
P. De Grauwe observed that since its introduction up to May
2000, the Euro has lost 25 % of its value in comparison with
the USD. The drop appeared to be unrelated to any new
information concerning basic fundamental variables. P. De
Grauwe concluded:
”(...) it is not the news in the fundamentals that drives
the exchange rate changes, but rather the other way
around: changes in the exchange rate lead to a se-
lection of news about the fundamentals (present and
future) that is consistent with the observed exchange
rate changes. (...) Thus, when at the start of 1999 the
dollar started to move upwards, this (...) set in motion
a search for good news about America and bad news
about Europe (...) (which) reinforced the exchange
rate movements (...).”
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We interpret P. De Grauwe’s story as fitting well into the
framework of
a) H. Simon’s general bounded rationality approach,
b) R.J. Shiller’s statement that agents tend to tell a coherent
story putting things together in an internally consistent
way,
while it is
c) adressing additional aspects of uncertainty.
To illustrate c) we assume, for the time being, that st as well
as some other variable are I(1) variables. Simulating then two
(independent) I(1) processes (see E. Zivot and J. Wang [18],
pp. 417ff) one gets a graph like the following:
! " ! # ! ! # " ! $ ! ! $ " !
% # "
% # !
% "
!
"
# !
# "
Figure 1: Two Simulated Independent Gaussian Random Walks
Obviously, there are movements in the simulated time series
which appear to be ”economically relevant”. Not knowing
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the possibly simple statistical origin of the movements, agents
might look for an economic interpretation of it, relating the
observations made to the influence of ”fundamental variables”.
Introducing then into this ”world” of random walk processes
(without drift) a cointegrating relationship will change the sce-
nario drastically showing a much more stable world:
! " ! # ! ! # " ! $ ! ! $ " !
!
"
# !
Figure 2: Simulated Trivariate Cointegrated System with one Cointegrat-
ing Vector
However, we have not found a cointegrating relation within our
set of foreign exchange variables. If then agents, looking for
an interpretation of movements in the time series st, do not
succeed in telling (subtle) coherent stories they still will make
their decisions. But this means
1. that agents (often) act, looking afterwards for the identi-
fication of ”causes”,
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2. that reasons will count and will be produced and consumed
by agents, giving way for instance to national banks like
the Swiss National Bank to become an influential partic-
ipant (investor) at foreign exchange markets.3
3. Agents’ behavior will not be explained completely if the
explaining reasons are not at the same time justifying ones.
It follows that agents generate and participate in specific so-
cial practices. In a general social practice ideas are applied,
semantic rules of logical thinking are obeyed and the power
for a commitment by a better argument is alive. The practice
happens mainly in discursive processes by which we make ex-
plicit a knowledge which is predominantly given implicit to us
by our experiences. Moreover, it makes a difference between
the intentions of an individual and a common one distributed
among a society. The very existence of the common intentions
implies, then, that agents live, think and deal in a network of
intentions (which may change over time). Additionally, the
network is related to a common basis of data.
Based on this set of data, agents realize that st does not fol-
low a random walk process with an error term of a martingal
difference sequence. It appears however that st is not ”very
far” from being a rwp and that a segmented rwp (see our
previous paper, Part I) with drift showing three regimes will
3 But national banks do behave according to chosen targets which change from time to time
while st is not the only target variable e.g. of the SNB, a price index represents an often even
more important one.
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be a more adequate maintained hypothesis:
1. a rwp with a clear positive drift,
2. a rwp with a clear negative drift,
3. a rwp with a (near) zero drift.
A corresponding ”social practice” is next concerned searching
coherent stories in order to identify the current state of st and
to predict the state of st+1.
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4 Random Walk Processes as Basic Components
To model social practices within possibly changing networks
of agents’ intentions we presented a first sketch using different
rwp jointly. To give a further justification for this approach
consider the following arguments:
It has been shown by experiments in which laboratory markets
simulate the trade on financial markets (V.L. Smith et al. [13])
that these markets show ”stable” behavior anticipating future
states if
1. agents are able to set up for this reliable expectations in an
environment which varies only to a small extent, and
2. the costs of creating expectations are seen to be much
lower for the agents than the probably resulting income.
Moreover, according to a description by Working and his fol-
lowers (K.J. Arrow [1]), who, even before 1953, discovered
through the observation of the fluctuation in security prices
and the prices of commodity futures on real markets that they
predominantly followed a ”random walk”
Pt = Pt−1 + εt
where εt; t = 1, 2, . . . is treated as a process of ”white noise”
which is at any time orthogonal to Pt−1.
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Working concluded that the agents completely evaluate the
information present in the data and in particular discover a
predictability of future security prices, in order to appropri-
ately alter their demand for the corresponding securities, in
such a way as to explore all possibilities of achieving a profit.4
But Working’s model has later on been rejected, because of
heteroscedasticity and/or regime switches in the ε′t s. Taking
monthly data and considering for example (demeanded) stock
returns, yt , the following model, see Ch.-J. Kim and Ch.R.
Nelsen [4], appears to be more in line with changing networks
of intentions, especially the existence of dissonances and the
resistance to alterations of the cognition:
The variable evolves, according to a first-order Markov process
with an unobserved state variable At containing three states
and the corresponding transition probabilities pij:
yt ∼ N
(
0,σ2t
)
σ2t = σ
2
1A1t + σ
2
2A2t + σ
2
3A3t
4 Working’s description of financial markets was later on generalized by the ”rational
expectation” approach. According to the RE description, a price variable yt representing the
market price of specific goods or of securities at a point in time t, is broken down to
yt = ypt + vt
with
ypt = E
[
yt|It−1
]
and E
[
vt|It−1
]
= 0 .
E[·|It−1] represents an expected value conditional on an information set It−1, and vt is a mean
innovation process only, ignoring moments of second order.
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Ait = 1 ; if At = i, i = 1, 2, 3
Ait = 0 ; otherwise
Pr
[
At = j
∣∣ At−1 = i] = pij ; i, j = 1, 2, 3
3∑
j=1
pij = 1 ; for i = 1, 2, 3
σ21 < σ
2
2 < σ
2
3
Notice that the above model introduces probabilities in two
different ways. While the normality assumption concerning
(yt) could be justified by something like a rational random be-
havior concept, the set of transition probabilities pij cannot
be justified in a similar manner. They are simply ascribed (by
us) to the model while their operationality remains still to be
shown.
Formalizing the approach for st correspondingly we get the
following model:
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(
1− L)(st − µAt) = et ; et ∼ N(0,σ2At)
Pr
{
At = j
∣∣ At−1 = i} = pij ; i, j = 1, 2, 3
3∑
j=1
pij = 1 ; ∀ i
µAt = µ
(1)A1t + µ
(2)A2t + µ
(3)A3t
σ2At = σ
2
1A1t + σ
2
2A2t + σ
2
3A3t
where Ait =
1 if At = i0 otherwise .
Taking then the monthly data for st in the period 1975.2 -
2003.5 the estimated drift terms (µ) and the estimated vari-
ances (σ2) for the regime errors are5
value s.e.
µ(1) −0.036 0.016
µ(2) 0.003 0.004
µ(3) −0.001 −0.019
σ21 0.708 · 10−3
σ22 0.830 · 10−3
σ23 3.050 · 10−3
5 The following results are generated using the MSV AR (Markov-Switching Vector AutoRe-
gressions) software package, version 1.31, for Ox, written by H.-M. Krolzig, Oxford University.
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Additionally, the transition matrix (pij) is estimated as
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
p1j 0.54 0.04 0.42
p2j 0.05 0.93 0.02
p3j 0.10 0.25 0.65
while the estimated smoother probabilities for regime 2 are
presented in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Spot Rate CHF/USD and Smoothed Probabilities Regime 2
We have to admit that the above results are still very sensitive
to a change in the time frame. Taking e.g. the shorter period
1978.2 - 2003.5 the estimated transition matrix is
23
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
p1j 0.01 0.01 0.98
p2j 0.00 0.99 0.01
p3j 0.57 0.06 0.37
We get again very different results for the period 1980.2 -
2003.5.
Assuming then the existence of 2 regimes only while consider-
ing the period 1980.2 - 2003.5 the estimated parameters are
j = 1 j = 2
p1,j 0.94 0.06
p2j 0.03 0.97
value s.e.
µ(1) −0.005 0.007
µ(2) 0.002 0.003
σ21 2.05 · 10−3
σ22 0.9 · 10−3
The following figure shows the estimated smoother probabil-
ities for regime 1. Notice the strange results for the period
94.01 - 03.05 and remember that the subdivision of the period
into regimes does result according to drift- and to variance
considerations.
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Figure 4: Spot Rate CHF/USD and Smoothed Probabilities Regime 1
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5 Conclusions
Obviously, the empirical results from above are very sensitive
to a change in the time frame and/or the number of regimes.
There is however one regime which appears to be invariant
across all our applications: It is the one with a positive
(but not significant) drift and a relatively low variance.
We suppose that particularly because of the other periods of
a non-increasing US dollar the switching regime model from
above does not lead to well defined transition probabilities.
As there is no empirical evidence that the DGP of st can be
described properly by a univariate segmented random walk
process although there are some indications of switching re-
gimes in st – what about constructing a bivariate process
containing the spot rate together with a corresponding for-
ward rate (an interest rate differential)? Obviously, this ap-
proach supplements P. De Grauwe’s quotation in a different
way from the above. In Part III of this paper we will discuss
and estimate a (revised) version of B.T. McCallum’s model,
including a regime switching process together with a set of
transition probabilities.
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